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Abstract
Recent unrest in China by migrant laborers’ increasing labor militancy, as well as unrest
caused by Islamic groups in China ranging from separatist movements to backlash from
discrimination have been the focus of the Chinese government’ attempts to main stability
within the PRC. In the largest country in the world, rapid changes as the result of
economic liberalization and the introduction of global capitalism have had drastic
impacts on society, from increasing inequality to the introduction of Western media and
ideas. Unrest has been accompanied by developments in civil society as Islamic
institutions chafing under Chinese regulations become places of political discourse and
migrant labors voice louder and louder demands independent and democratically elected
trade unions. The Hui, the third largest ethnic minority in China and the largest Muslims
minority have been involved in these recent civil society developments as both migrant
workers and as an economically disadvantaged group. Their experience as a Muslim
minority frequently subject to discrimination, an ethnic group with well-established
Islamic institutions and community centers and their migrant worker identity all
contribute to them having a unique role in the development of civil society in China.
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Introduction
While in the past decades the global community has acknowledged China as an
important engine1 of global economic growth, the last 3 years have been mired in labor
unrest that continues to threaten economic and political stability. Spikes in unrest were
subsequently followed by the government’s pacification of the turmoil in the form of new
legislation better protecting workers. In 2008, the Labor Contract Law and the Labor
Dispute and Mediation Law went into enforcement, a landmark piece of legislation and
one of the few major developments since China adopted its first labor law in 1994.2 The
enactment of the law abolished the system of at-will employment for most full-time
employees and required employers to offer employees with written contracts, allowing
laborers more protection vis-à-vis employers. In 2011, the government further enacted
the Work-Related Injury Insurance Regulation that eliminated some of the gaps in injury
payments between poor and wealthy regions of China.3 While some will credit the
government’s updating of labor laws as benevolent gestures by ‘big brother,’ a view from
the bottom up gives a narrative of escalation in state-labor conflict as the primary
motivation in the change of laws. It is not the generosity of the Communist Party, but the
1

Shengxia, Song. "China still engine of economic growth - GlobalTimes." Globaltimes_china business.
http://business.globaltimes.cn/china-economy/2011-04/643746.html (accessed December 3, 2011).

2

" PRC Employment Contract Law / 中华人民共和国劳动合同法 - China Law & Practice ." China Law
and Practice Home. http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1425355/PRC-Employment-ContractLaw.html (accessed December 3, 2011)
3

"Work-related Injury Insurance Regulations_上海劳动法律网." 上海劳动法律网_劳动者维权律师|上海
劳动律师|劳动法|劳动合同法|劳动纠纷|劳动仲裁|工伤认定|社会保险|辞退|辞职|经济补偿|产假|孕期.
http://zzttlaw.com/documents-information/work-related-injury-insurance-regulations.html (accessed
December 3, 2011).
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struggle and demands of laborers that are increasingly willing to resort to militant means
to address pay-related grievances and inadequate working conditions, including strikes
and sabotage.4 As if labor unrest was not enough to deal with, in the run up to the 2008
Beijing Olympics four deadly bus bombs went off in Kunming and Shanghai. The three
bus bombs in Kunming killed 2 and injured 14. The Turkistan Independence Party (TIP),
an Islamist separatist group based in restive Xinjiang, claimed responsibility and released
a video entitled “Our Blessed Jihad in Yunnan.” While Yunnan government officials
were quick to deny that it was indeed domestic terrorism, whether to fend off fear in
China’s urban areas or fend off Western criticism, the official reports of the Chinese
government leave much room for speculation.5 If only to raise suspicion that the incidents
were indeed terrorist attacks, any reports suggesting that they were terrorism-related were
(and as of December 2011 still are) censored on the Internet in Mainland China.6 The
incident was only the latest of terrorism that has alienated and troubled China’s Muslim
community, a community already facing heavy discrimination. Where does this
instability leave Muslim migrant laborers, taking part in both the growing labor militancy
along with millions of other migrant laborers while also subject to discrimination and
violence as the world’s eyes remain glued to ‘the global war on terrorism’ and it’s
coverage on Islamic extremism? Furthermore, as a group under growing pressure, how
4

"China takes hands-off approach to labor strikes - World news - Asia-Pacific - msnbc.com."
msnbc.com . http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37932967/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/china-takeshands-off-approach-labor-strikes/ (accessed December 5, 2011).
5

" Police deny 'terrorist attacks' behind recent explosions -- china.org.cn." China.org.cn - China news,
weather, business, travel & language courses. http://www.china.org.cn/china/local/200807/26/content_16076634.htm (accessed December 3, 2011)
6

In addition to news sources that take the point of view that the attacks were indeed terrorismrelated, blogs, an avenue that has also voiced opinions alternate to that of the official Yunnan
provincial viewpoint, have also been under increasing censorship.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-04-24-china-bloggers-crackdown-human-rights.htm
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can do they play a role in the development of Chinese civil society that looks to address
the challenges of citizen empowerment and increasing democratic participation, targeting
issues such as discrimination and labor grievances?
I conducting research to better understand the lives of China’s Muslim urban
laborers, specifically those that had migrated in order for better job prospects that have
played an instrumental role in China’s growing economy and understand their potential
for the development of civil society. In narrowing down this broad topic, I decided to
study the Hui minority group, a group with a long history in Kunming and Yunnan, but
also a community supporting a constant flow of migrants from other parts of China in
search of labor. I researched the experiences of other non-Hui migrant workers for a
comparative analysis, and observed that the situation of the Hui as Muslims minorities
gave them a peculiar and distinct experience. The Hui (along with 9 other ethnic
minorities, primarily located in the northwest) are unique relative to the Han Chinese
majority by virtue of their Muslim culture. With this cultural difference comes several
other aspects that impacted their ability to find jobs in the urban Kunming labor market:
connections to Islamic institutions such as the mosque, shared religion and a sense of
immediate community with previously established Hui, and subjection to discrimination
by non-Hui employers stood out prominently as distinct differences with the non-Hui
migrant experience. These advantages and challenges of the Hui in their adjustment to the
city of Kunming speak uniquely to the Hui, and thus have made the Hui migrant labor
experience one of particular interest in while also providing a fresh and alternate
perspective in terms of China’s developing civil society.

7

In addition to my research findings covering the experiences of the urban Hui
migrant laborers, I have added an extended analysis of global events related to Islam as
well as current trends in the Chinese economy related to labor for the purpose of
connecting the Hui experience with events that play a role on the bigger picture of
developing civil society. In a country with an increasing labor shortage and rising labor
militancy, but with no true independent trade union7 to represent their grievances and
lacking in strong community organizations, the Muslim community of laborers are
unique in their access to faith-based organization that develop a strong sense of
community in Chinese urban areas among Hui migrants. While the Muslim community
helps migrants adjust to the city and serves as a community center, The Hui and their
urban community organizing structure stand out as a unique pathway for developing civil
society in China.
In this paper I will examine how the unique experiences of the urban Hui migrant
laborer can contribute to the development of civil society in China. In order to do so I
took aim at several aspects: (1) the history of Islam in China, specifically in Yunnan (2)
past history and trends in migrant labor and rising labor militancy (3) the unique
experiences between the Muslim Hui laborers that have migrated to the city in contrast
with other migrants, (4) the function of Islam and institutions and their role in Hui
migrant laborers’ transition to the urban labor environment and finally (5) and lastly an
analysis on the potential development of civil society in China based on research on the
Hui laborer community in light of international events and China’s changing social and
economic climate.
7

Lee, Ching Kwan. Against the law: labor protests in China's rustbelt and sunbelt. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2007.
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Research Methods

My research took place in the month of November starting on the 6th and ending
on the 26th.

My chosen field site was the area immediately surrounding Shuncheng Road, an
area that was once the center of the Old Muslim town in Kunming, Yunnan. Today most
of the old neighborhood has been torn down and replaced by a large up-scale shopping
area, however the Shuncheng area around the mosque still provide many Hui migrant
laborers willing to talk about their experience. The campus of Yunnan Nationalities
University also provided a helpful environment to learn about from both Hui and Han
students.

My research methods consisted primarily of in-depth and casual interviews. Indepth interviews primarily took place in the mosque courtyard and at Hui restaurants in
the area. Casual interviews used to relatively basic data often took place at the workplace
of the interviewee, ranging anywhere from on the street while they sold meat to in shops
where they worked.

9

In addition, I used participation observation as another research method, attending Friday
prayer at the mosque and also ‘hanging out’ at the mosque to meet people and understand
the role the mosque played in Hui laborers life.
**Note: All names of interviewees have been altered in concern of privacy**

Background Information
In order to understand the Hui migrant laborers situation in Kunming, two
preliminary topics must deserve brief mention for an accurate historical context (1) a
brief history of Islam in China, and (2) the economic development that has precipitated
the massive influx of migrant workers to urban areas. Moreover, both have shaped
contemporary Hui urban identity and are distinguished in how their histories potential for
development of civil society in China.

Islam in China
Although the topic of religion in China often evokes Buddhism (the most popular)
and Taoism (China’s only native major world religion), Islam’s history in China has had
a long and lasting influence and also shares the distinction as one of the world’s major
religions.8 As a world religion non-native to China, Islam has had the added effect of
blending foreign influence into the culture of China, as well as China’s culture having a
peculiar influence on Islam in China, visible in the architecture of mosques and the Hui
Muslims celebration of traditional Chinese holiday such as Chinese New Year.9 Today it

8
9

Shoujiang, Mi, and You Jia. Islam in China. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2004.
Dru, Gladney. "Islam in China: Accomodation or Seperation." The China Quarterly 174 (2003): 451-467.
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is the third (or fourth, pending accurate statistics on the underground household Christian
movement) most popular religion in China and is reported to have anywhere between
500,000 and 1 million practitioners in Yunnan alone. Islam’s history in China dates back
to the first official delegation headed by Sa'ad ibn Waqqas a maternal uncle of the
Prophet in 650 CE. With the rise in trade interaction, Muslim traders came to dominate
the import and export system by the Song dynasty. Muslims have held several important
positions in Chinese history, from the leader of the construction of the city that would
become present-day China’s capital of Beijing (after the original capital of the Jin was
burnt down) to Zheng He, China’s most famous explorer who led China’s seven
expeditions to the Indian Ocean.10 Islam’s early presence in China and Yunnan is
characterized by tolerance and relative peace, confirmed by the high rate of intermarriage
between the Hui and the Han.11
The history of Islam in China since the 19th century is turbulent and bloody, and
the sustained collective memory by Hui scholars and educated members of the Islamic
community today demonstrate that the events of the past are not only relevant but leave
lasting effects on their identity, relations with the Han, and CCP (Chinese Communist
Party) suspicion of the Muslims as threats to stability. Repression from Qing officials in
the mid-19th century led to five Hui rebellions, the most famous historical example in
Yunnan being the Panthay Rebellion that flared from 1856-1873 that killed over 1
million people as the Hui and other ethnic groups rebelled against the Qing court. In
northwest China the Dungan revolt raged from 1862-1867 and resulted in the deaths of

10
11

Ibid.
Shoujiang, Mi, and You Jia. Islam in China. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2004.
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several million. Although not necessarily for religious reasons but instead with reasons
stemming from class welfare and ethnic discrimination by the Han, these Muslim-led
rebellions today are reminders of past disputes that are still brought up in the discourse of
Hui-Han relations today, especially in reference to the current state of anti-Muslim
sentiment and Hui marginalization.

Migrant Labor in China: A Product of Economic Development
Arising from the economic and agricultural reforms in China during the 70s,
China has found itself with a mobile, low skilled and in recent years, increasingly militant
migrant labor population. The phenomena of the largest nomadic society in the world,
China’s migrant workers that numbered over 180 million in 2008,12 has been of academic
interest to those seeking to understand the development of capitalism in the People’s
Republic of China as well as the accompanied developments of labor law, labor activism
and the social consequences of urban and rural areas accommodation to the new ebb and
flow of labor of mobile labor.
The story begins in both rural areas, where economic reforms de-collectivizing
agriculture were carried out, and in urban areas where Special Economic Zones (SEZ)
allowed foreign corporations to set up manufacturing factories. With labor freed up from
rural areas as productivity increased and the lure of higher wages in cities grew stronger
with more and more FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), mass migration to the cities

12

"China's Internal Migrants." Council on Foreign Relations. www.cfr.org/china/chinas-internalmigrants/p12943 (accessed December 3, 2011).
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followed, but not without lagging policy adjustments concerning the huge economicinduced migration.
Even today as migrant workers from rural areas account for 40 percent of the
urban labor force, the hukou or housing registration system has denied them many of the
benefits received by urban residents, contributing not only to inequality, but
discrimination and segregation within urban societies.13 Even with the CCP’s recent
attempts to make the urban hukou more accessible, it remains available only to the
wealthiest of migrant workers, creating but more divisions in urban society, stratifying
the migrant worker class. Hukou troubles aside, migrant workers face a myriad of
problems in transition to urban areas; according to the China Labor Bulletin (CLB), a
Hong Kong-based NGO, "Migrant workers in general, and female migrants in particular,
who generally work in low-paid, labor-intensive sectors, are often subjected to long
overtime hours, poor or unsafe working conditions and frequently are owed back wages
by employers.”14
How industrial restructuring and economic reforms have brought about growing
labor unrest has been well documented by UCLA professor Ching Kwan Lee in her book
Against the Law, focusing on comparative analysis of workers in the north and south and
their divulging approaches to labor activism. And while her conclusions that labor
activism has yet to reach the full out solidarity based–organizing necessary for full
fledged independent trade unions to develop independently by Chinese laborers, the
13

Fan, Cindy. "The Elite, the Natives, and the Outsiders: Migration and Labor Market Segmentation in
Urban China." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 92, no. 1 (2002): 103-124.
14

""Dagongmei" - Female Migrant Labourers | CLB." Home | CLB.
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/3448/print (accessed December 5, 2011).
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recent labor shortage adds new light to the prospects of the development of labor-based
civil society.15
At the intersectional points of oppression, the Muslim Hui migrant laborer also
stands at the edge of the prospects for developing civil society in China.

Push and Pull Factors for Migration: Kunming as a ‘Pull’ City
Although rural to urban migration is hardly unique to China, the sheer mass of
migrants, the unique restrictive ‘hukou’ housing registration separating urban and rural
dwellers and the rapid economic growth of China as well as fast-changing social relations
economic reforms in the 70s has made rural to urban migration an intriguing and
contemporary topic in trying to understand present-day China’s economy and society.
The development of urban centers and the resultant rural drain have had additional
consequences given China’s long history as an agricultural society; social relations
between family members, occupational shifts and lifestyle preferences are all to be
expected in China’s era of rapid modernization, industrialization and urbanization. Key to
this development are the laborers who have been building the new China. They flood
cities on the lure of jobs, education prospects and ‘modern’ living, wishing to take part in
contemporary China’s immense wealth as seen from their rural TVs. This group has
been key in China’s rise economically as an being an export-based nation, relying on
cheap, low-skilled labor to compete at a comparative advantage with other developing
nations.
15

Bradsher, Keith. "An Independent Labor Movement Stirs in China - NYTimes.com." The New
York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/business/global/11strike.html?pagewanted=all (accessed
December 5, 2011).
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From 1949-1978, China operated on a socialist system of economics—almost all
aspects of Chinese citizens lives were administered by the government including housing,
food, consumption and labor, all were government-regulated. With Deng Xiaopeng’s
economic reforms in the 1970s, all of this would change.
The first economic reforms took place in the countryside—in 1978, farmers were
allowed to allocate their own production of food, freeing up labor from the farms. Since
1958, and the beginning of the hukou system16 the Chinese government has worked to
manage the flow of labor. There are generally two ways to divide migrants to the cities,
those with local residency rights, or hukou migrants, and those without local residency
rights, non-hukou migrants. The hukou fulfills the purpose as an ‘internal passport.’ This
allows the government to control mobility through exclusion of benefits. The urban
hukou brings with it advantages such as access to local social services and has to be
applied for. The non-hukou population is more often called the ‘floating population’
because of their mobility; they will often work in the city for one season and me return
home to harvest crops in the rural areas the next. The floating population is lower on the
urban social hierarchy, working doing more tedious low-skill labor jobs such as
construction or in factories. The implications for these migrant workers as they come to
the city are unemployment and poverty as well as putting stresses on already overburdened social welfare systems. Finding affordable housing has become a growing
concern as well as accommodating the children of migrant workers in terms of education.
While urbanization has made China wealthy off the backs of many low-wage laborers
producing products sold globally, the living conditions of migrant workers and the
16

Zhang, Li. Strangers in the city: reconfiguration of space, power, and social networks within
China's floating population. Stanford: Stanford Press, 2001.
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inability to get by has pushed many migrants to the limits. The system has created
pressure on those with rural hukous to return to the country, even as the city offers more
in terms of jobs and wealth and the rural areas are increasingly deplete of populations. “It
is very problematic,” 17 said Professor He Jinsong, a reasearcher at Yunnan Social
Sciences Academy with a focus on migrations studies. “For people without skills from
the country, and especially their kids when they are born in the city but do not have an
urban hukou card. For them a cycle of poverty is likely.” A migrant from Sichuan that
works at a hair salon that is not an urban hukou card holder described:

“The life in the village is very difficult, so I came to Kunming to find work. If
you are young it is a little easier to have a job, but if you are older then it gets
very difficult. If I have an apartment then I can get an urban hukou, but right
now that is impossible (too expensive). I am just happy to be in the city because
here I can find a job. In the village there are none, no possibilities.” 18
The experiences of Kunming’s non-Hui and Hui migrant workers confirm that
undertaking migrant labor, regardless of ethnicity is wrought with challenges. On an
individual basis, the challenges vary—discrimination based on religion for the Hui but
with a community safety net found in the Islamic community, and discrimination based
primarily on migrant worker status for non-Hui workers but with dependency on survival
based on personal connections developed in the city.
Economic reforms and neoliberal policies since the 1970s have opened up a huge
demand for labor at first on the eastern seaboard and increasingly inward to central cities
as well. As a once relatively stable, rural agriculturally based society, China has seen a

17
18

He, Jinsong. Interview by author. Personal interview. Coffeeshop, October 13, 2011.
Li, Xiaojie. Interview by author. Personal interview. Salon on Wenlin Jie, November 20, 2011.
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dramatic rush to the cities. While still majority rural, the increasing urbanization has had
drastic social consequences for people all over China; the villages that are left to deal
with a disappearing youth as they migrate to the cities in search of work, the cities that
deal with an influx of strangers unaccustomed to urban life or culture, and finally the
migrants themselves, who hold back homesickness and adjustment difficulties in favor of
greater job opportunities in unfamiliar cities.
Kunming is one of those cities. Absorbing migrants from all over Yunnan and
much of Western and Central China, Kunming has become a bustling city of over 6
million residents and climbing, with non-permanent residents (primarily migrant
workers) accounting for over 1 million. 19 Yunnan ranks first among Chinese provinces in
terms of the number of ethnic minorities; diversity has made ethnic minority-based
tourism a big industry and moneymaker. Ethnic minorities make up a sizeable portion of
the Kunming population, many of them migrants from poorer rural areas coming to
Kunming in search of their piece of the new China wealth pie.

Who are the Hui?

“ All Hui under Heaven are on family”- a commonly cited quote among Kunming’s Hui
“天下回回是一家“

19

"Kunming Population: Population Density, Statistics, People living in Kunming." China Tours 2011,
Tour Packages, Vacations, Local Travel Agency & Tour Operator Trusted.
http://www.chinatouronline.com/china-travel/kunming/kunming-facts/kunming-population.html (accessed
December 2, 2011)
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The Hui ethnic minority is the third of largest of Chinese 55 ethnic minorities
numbering at over 9 million.20 The Hui use Mandarin as the official language and share
many Chinese customs, thus reinforcing the commonly held belief that they are among
the more integrated minorities in Chinese society. The Hui are descendants of the Persian
and Arab traders and are one of 10 ethnic minority groups that practice Islam. Different
from other Islamic practicing minorities found primarily on the border of Central Asia,
the Hui are found all over China, particularly in cities. The ethnic category of the Hui
was used by the commission on identifying ethnic minorities primarily as a catch all for
any Muslims that did not have their own other language (such as the Dungan), unlike
those with their own such as the the Uigur, Kazak, Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Baoan, Salar,
Dongxiang, and Tatar, who all predominately practice Islam. The Hui are unique in that
although some have physical characteristics that differ from the general Chinese populace
(particularly on the bordering areas of Central Asia), and that they generally speak the
language of whatever populace they live in (most commonly Mandarin), the majority of
the Hui are physically and linguistically indistinguishable from the Han.21 They are
largely an urban minority, making up the biggest ethnic minority in China’s largest cities
such as Shanghai and Beijing, but are in competition as the primarily minority China’s
border provinces where ethnic minorities are more common, such as in Yunnan.
Although wide spread over China, the Hui primarily come from Ningxia, Gansu, Henan,
Xinjiang ,Qinghai, Guizhou and Yunnan, which has the sixth largest Hui population.22

20

Shoujiang, Mi, and You Jia. Islam in China. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2004.

21

Caffrey, Kevin N.. China's Muslim frontier: empire, nation, and transformation in Yunnan.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
22 Ibid.
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In recent years, the growing importance of Kunming , the capital of Yunnan, as a
center of life and work in greater southwestern China has attracted more and more
migrant workers, the Hui among them. How do these Hui migrant workers experiences
compare to those of other ethnic minorities? What unique challenges are presented to the
Hui specifically? What are their advantages? In this section I will examine the unique
situation of the Hui migrants to Kunming, shedding light on the role religion has in
adjusting to the city in everything from finding a job to creating a sense of community.

Discrimination and Community: The Experiences of Migrant Hui Laborers in
Kunming

The Dual Function of the Mosque: Religious and community center

For Hui laborers arriving in Kunming, the first stop is often the mosque. Home to
6 well-known historical mosques as well as other smaller mosques, Kunming has a
vibrant Muslim community, albeit one that has seen its traditional neighborhood largely
demolished. One such mosque, the Shuncheng mosque sits in what was once the center
point of a large Muslim quarter of the city, the majority of which was recently
demolished as Kunming’s rapid development has replaced it with modern skyscrapers
and shopping complexes. In addition to the mosques is a nearby, a Hui-serving Middle
School on the same street anchors out what is one of the last remainders of the old
Muslim community and one of the last old streets in Kunming. The functions of the
mosque are varied, but its core purpose is to serve as a religious and community center.

19

Hui restaurants that are heavily concentrated in the area serve as another place for public
discourse. On an official level, Kunming also hosts the Yunnan Branch of the Islam
Association of China, founded in 1984 and with an office is in the Shuncheng Mosque
complex. As far as open areas for discussion and community development however, Hui
residents are far more likely to be discussing current events in one of the many
‘Qingzhen’ restaurants located near the mosque or in the open square of the mosque
itself.
From the mosque, new arrivals are able to access a number of services, most
importantly information on the “daily functions of life: eating, living, and
working.”23From the informal gatherings of long-time residents and those newly arrived,
to the students that fill the classroom with hopes of learning Arabic, the Shuncheng
mosque complex feels worlds (and at time decades) away from the new modern shopping
and apartment complexes nearby. The mosque as a community center brings together
Hui from around the neighborhood and provides a crucial centerpiece to a Hui population
that is increasingly being spread out over the city following the loss of much of the Old
Muslim town. It is here that Hui who have just arrived meet native or long-time Kunming
Hui, easing the adjustment pains, many of which are not only based on the extraordinary
distance traveled, but that of the rural to urban culture shock. Although from an official
standpoint mosques serve the religious needs, they also extend themselves into the sphere
of pubic services in assisting with labor, housing and general adjustment in a way that is
exclusive to the Hui Muslims. These services, traditionally provided by the Chinese
government from 1949-1978 but significantly reduced by the diminishing role of the state
23

Sha, Xiansheng. Interview by author. Personal interview. Shuncheng Mosque, November 12,
2011.
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due to economic reforms, have become important aspects of faith-based institutions
stepping in where the government either does not care of lacks funds to assist migrant
laborers.

Cultural Consumption Trials

“To the ruler, the people are heaven; to the people, food is heaven”- Ancient Chinese
Proverb

Food plays an important role in Chinese culture. This is a cultural trait
generally shared with the Hui people, but with an important difference: like Muslims
around the world, the Hui eat halal or in China what is known as qingzhen (清真), or pure
foods. For Muslims in China, the search for such ‘pure’ food varies in difficulty; in
Kunming, an abundance of Hui restaurants have been established and serves both a Hui
and non-Hui clientele. The biggest culinary challenge is in fact the search for pork-free
(and thus lard-free) foods outside of the Hui household or restaurant. As a result of the
CCP’s official stance regarding and respecting minorities, universities in areas with high
Muslim populations have accommodate Muslim students with the addition of a separate
canteen. This accommodation however has not always gone smoothly, as one Hui I spoke
to expressed frustration:

“When I started out at school in 1999, there was no Muslim canteen. My
Muslim roommates and I went to ask the administrators. They were reluctant,
but we pushed on, because being Muslim means eating qingzhen food. We had
no place to eat. The university did not understand us. We were persistent and
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we kept asking and eventually they set up a small part of the canteen for Muslim
students. We thought this was a big improvement but later learned that the cooks
preparing the food were not Muslim, and not versed on how to properly cook
qingzhen food.”24
Even though the Han have lived by the side of the Hui for centuries and most Han
understand that Hui do not eat pork, consideration and true understanding of this concept
is remarkably still lacking, evidence of a larger cultural disconnect between the Hui and
the Han. One Hui student described this difficulty:

“In class our Han teacher was explaining why Hui people do not eat pork. She
replied that because Islam was from Saudi Arabia, and the environment in Saudi
Arabia was too harsh to raise pigs. There is little willingness on the part of Han
to understand Hui people and customs. Marx, Lenin and Einstein, all of them
geniuses admired by the Han, did not eat pork, yet Han people still don’t
understand.”25
For Hui with an understanding of Islam and Hui heritage, the problem has led to
awkward and at times difficult dealings with the Han majority, even in the supposedly
more liberal university setting. If even enlightened professors are unable to speak
accurately on the traditions of the Hui, then the prospects for the everyday Han to
understand the Hui minority are slim. Of the 10 Han I spoke to regarding the Hui
tradition of not eating pork, not one responded correctly.26

Smoke-free in the tobacco province
24

Hu, Xiansheng. Interview by author. Personal interview. Shuncheng Mosque, November 5,
2011.
25
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2011.
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was that the Hui had special reverence toward the pig, either as sacred or as an ancestor.
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Although culinary-based, the cultural importance of such consumption habits in
China can hardly be understated. The preparation and consumption of food in China are
done communally and with thousands of years of history and culture behind it. To
understand the cultural barrier that food separates for the Hui and the Han majority then
cannot be fully understood without a understanding the extremely high regard the Han
Chinese place on food and drink as essential components in Chinese culture.
In addition to abstaining from pork, the Hui generally abstain from cigarettes and
alcohol (although the younger generations are more likely to decide for themselves
whether or not to continue the traditional abstention), two important parts of Chinese
culinary culture. In a country where 70% of the men smoke and smoking is seen as a
social custom, the usage of tobacco adds but another cultural barrier between the Hui and
the Han. Yunnan is in fact the tobacco capital of China; for Hui college students in
Kunming where over 40% of college students smoke, the problem is especially
pronounced.27) Smoking is not only important economically (revenues from tobacco
production contributed 50% of total tax revenues collected by the Yunnan Provincial
Government28 but importantly as a masculine social custom. From a traditionally topdown government influenced-society, anthropologist Khorman notes that the image of
smoking has been portrayed to the Chinese people has been that of the “PRC’s largely
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male leadership exchanging and smoking cigarettes,” leaving the custom of smoking
tobacco as an one of utmost social acceptance and masculine custom.29

Hui determination based on visual appearance

Besides from what they eat and drink, dress serves as another divisive
issue fro some Hui, as younger urban generations are more likely to trade in traditional
Islamic gear for mainstream Chinese or western style. Many Hui continue to wear
traditional Islamic clothing when attending mosque, resembling their brethren in the
Middle East despite geographical and cultural differences. Outside of the mosque
however, the Hui population in Kunming may look just like any other Han Chinese. With
the exception of the donning of a taqiyah (cap for men) or a headscarf, the Hui are
inseparable from the Han based on looks alone. Many prefer to wear the cap and
headscarf as a sign of Islamic heritage, the head covering being the most obvious visual
marker of the Hui in China. In accordance with the teaching of the Prophet Mohammad,
the Koran calls on women to cover themselves modestly, ranging from a full on hijab to
the simple headdress, the most popular option among Kunming’s Hui women. The
Prophet Muhammed once said that "The distinction between us and the polytheists is the
turbans over our caps,”30 and in today’s modern Kunming it can be said that the cap
instead differentiates the Han and the Hui.

Khorman, Andrew. "Depoliticizing Tobacco’s Exceptionality: Male Sociality, Death and
Memory-Making Among Chinese Cigarette Smokers." The China Journal 58 (2007): 86. Print.
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The Consequences of Different Customs: Misunderstanding and Discrimination

What do the above consumption-based cultural differences as well as dress
differences between the Han and Hui have on the social adjustment of the Hui into urban
Chinese life, and furthermore what are there implications on labor?
For many Hui looking for work, these cultural factors come into play, as well as
some factors that are beyond their control, namely historical and media-based influence.
Many Hui reported feeling discrimination against by potential Han employers. While
casual relations in public are generally ones of mutual respect between the Han and the
Hui, their shared past has been one of turbulence. Though historical, awareness of past
Muslims rebellions, particularly the Panthay Rebellion in Yunnan, is an important part of
Yunnan’s history. These past histories, as well as well as media coverage of well-known
contemporary issues (notably the Uighur minority separatist movement in Xinjiang) have
led to discrimination. Without wearing traditional Muslim dress, it is possible to get a job
without an employer knowing that you are Hui, but while wearing Muslim dress, the
situation becomes more complex. The influence of state and global media in recent years
has hardly brought about positive perceptions of Muslims globally. One remarkable
connection to American media has been coverage of the September 11, 2001 attacks in
New York and the following War on Terror. The incident was widely reported
throughout the globe as well as the global chase for Osama bin Laden. The connections
of the worlds ‘Muslim’ ‘war on terror’ and ‘osama bin laden’ as paraded prominently by
the American media has had effects far beyond the national borders of the US. When
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discussing employment with one young Muslim Hui about finding work in Kunming, this
global influence of media was exemplified as she quipped:

“If I were a hijab I will have no way to get a job. They will think I am a terrorist,
like Osama bin laden. This is what Han people see on the news and they believe
it.”31
Her bitter experience about job prospects are shared by other Hui interviewed that
said that their chances of getting a job were smaller when competing with other Han
applicants at Han owned businesses. As much of the old Muslim town has been torn
down, so too has much of the traditional middle class livelihoods usually occupied by the
Hui as a result of foreign multinational corporations having set up eager to take
advantage of the growing domestic consumer base of urban China. The Wangfujin
complex is one such example, sprawling carelessly across the street from the Shuncheng
Mosque. The two sides of the street contrast sharply; Wangfujin being home to Starbucks
and Hagen Dazs, and characterized as a popular shopping spot for well-off Kunming
residents, while the other side sits the mosque, traditional butcheries, qingzhen restaurants
and an Islamic school. During the day one can buy Islamic art, dress and food in a cluster
of shops as well as spices from other provinces directly outside the mosque gate. The
vibrancy of colors, headdresses and foods from far off, clash with the concrete, clean and
ultra modern shopping complex and give visitors the impression that one is not in a single
city but two distinct cities.
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The removal of most of the old Muslim neighborhood to make way for the new
high-end shopping district and rapid modernization has narrowed the traditional job
opportunities for many incoming Hui in their traditional occupations, while at the same
time causing the Hui to be spread thinner across Kunming. With the destruction of most
of the Old Muslim town, many Hui in Kunming have still managed to do much of the
jobs they do in other urban areas: selling grilled meat, working with jewelry, leather work
and working in small restaurants, all jobs whose tradition come from an Islamic custom
that placed restrictions on diet and hygiene. However, overall these relatively wellpaying skill-based crafts have in the immediate vicinity of the traditional old Muslim
town been replaced by the service industry jobs in the shopping mall and at fast food
chains. Herein lies a discriminatory issue in that much of this kind of work is preferential
to the Han because of visual component to the job (i.e, the homogenous look of the Han
Chinese, devoid of Islamic headgear). To work in these service sector job requires an
outward appearance that is familiar and acceptable to most Han. Thus, the observation
that wearing a hijab or taqiyah can be a detriment in finding a job seems only fitting in
the need to match the market of the customers looking to the homogenous, globalized and
repetitive nature of the 21st century service industry that China has embraced since
economic liberalization.
This seeming rebuttal of the emerging service industry to the Hui has made their
traditional skill-based jobs all the more important as a source of livelihood. What kind of
jobs to the Hui still find? “Only the hardest jobs,” voiced one Hui meat seller, a sentiment
echoed by an official at the Shuncheng Mosque as well. Most popular nightspots in
Kunming, from Kundu to Nanping Jie all have an abundance of Hui kebab sellers,
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working long into the night. At this job, Hui are not only acceptable in wearing the cap,
but expected to. As individual entrepreneurs, many with their own capital (grill and
utensils) these Hui have carved a niche in urban labor. The traditional jobs such as
jewelry work and butchering lamb and beef do however appear more and more at risk as
neoliberal economic reforms increasingly open China up to foreign investment and as
rapid paced modernization outpaces traditional skill-based jobs. In its replacement, many
migrant worker Hui have found work in the same field as many migrant other migrants,
low-skill service jobs, working in factories, picking up trash, and construction of China’s
relentless building projects.

Migration to the City and the Search for Work: A Han and Hui Comparison
The Hui migrant labor experience, although mired in discrimination but also
characterized by an Islamic network ready to accept Hui from afar into the community
and assists with housing, food, and labor provides a contrast to the conventional
experience of migrant labors from rural China. On finding a job in the city, one non-Hui
migrant worker named ‘Wang’ described her experience as one initially lacking
community:

I have to ‘run around’ to find jobs. At first, I did not know anyone, I just had to
ask around and hope I could find work. I found a job helping a family do chores,
then one at the restaurant then selling various things on the street. Even though I
have been here for a long time (over 20 years) I still run around to find a job.
But now, I have friends here they help me find work, they have connections.
Finding a job is very difficult.32
32

Wang, Taitai. Interview by author. Personal interview. Outside of Yunnan Nationalities
University, November 14, 2011.
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Work connections through friends and family has been a crucial aspect for all
migrant workers looking for work, both of which many Hui find more accessible than
non-Hui via the Islamic community. Informal connections and guanxi(relationships)
prove extremely useful, especially for those who have just arrived. Many migrants look
to those that have come from the same town (Laojia 老家), forming an instant connection
based on geography. For Hui migrants, the Islamic community then has proven to be an
advantage compared to other migrant workers. A Hui originally from Gansu named
‘Liu,’ who started out selling Islamic dress and has now owns a store on Shuncheng road
describes his experience as one with minimal difficulty:

It was easier for me to get a job then maybe others. If you don’t know anyone,
of course it is difficult. I didn’t know anyone here, but because we are Muslims
we always help other Muslims. It is one of the three important parts of Islam.
Kunming is a special place, it is very diverse, lots of people from other
provinces come here to find work. It is good for my son to grow up here, here he
also can learn Arabic. “All Muslims are one family”33
In addition to owning the shop on Shuncheng Lu, the shop owner is a devout Muslim,
who proudly told me that he “prays 5 times a day” and is committed to his son receiving
a proper Islamic education. His Muslim identity then has helped to establish an extensive
community network, one that includes the mosque, the school, and other Hui restaurants
and shops. In a word, he has become a community member, invested in his
neighborhood and the institutions that define it. By contrast, although she has been in the
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city for an equal amount of time, ‘Wang’ remarks that she has no serious attachments to
any neighborhood institutions. Getting her daughter to college and making money are the
most important. While this is also important to ‘Liu’, his spirituality plays a large role in
his assignment of priorities, and his Islamic faith has stressed the need for a more active
role in civic life and concern for community.
The ability to connect with people willing to help you, as well as the ability to
make friends and develop a sense of community place a unique role in Chinese urban
labor relations and has an impact on the success of finding a job or even whether the
migrant decides to remain in the city. More than one migrant described failures to do so,
citing “loneliness and homesickness”, as well as an inability to adjust to urban “Kunming
life.” At the end of the day in a strange city without friends or work, many migrants
simply wish to return home.
In addition, migrant workers generally face discrimination from city natives,
remarking on their “backwardness” and their clinging to “village” ways. Here it is a clash
of culture not just between urban and rural, but what some see as modern and old. The
peculiar history of the Hui has lent itself to additional stereotypes. One fellow Han
student at Yunnan Nationalities University told me that “Hui are greedy and only care
about money, some will even go as far as to theft,” while another Han student countered
her in saying that the Hui “aren’t especially greedy, but just are very clever at making
money.”34

Islam Today: Uyghur in the West and the Implication for Kunming’s Muslims
Feng Xiaojie, Lin Xiansheng. Interview by author. Personal interview. Yunnan Nationalities
University courtyard, November 14, 2011.
34
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While the Hui are China’s most populace Muslim minority, the Uyghur may very
have the most notorious reputation. Living primarily in Xinjiang, the largest
administrative district in China occupying a full 1/6 of China’s land, the Uyghur are a
Turkic people also found in neighboring Kazakstan and Kyrgystan. Having not
completely consolidated jurisdiction over the entire Xinjiang area into what is today’s
Peoples Republic of China until the 19th century under the Qing Dynasty, many Uyghur
feel they have been wronged by the government and have legitimate claims to the
land.35With no less than three revolts since the mid-19th century,36 the Uyghur have
recently resurfaced in international news after the July 200937 riots that killed over
estimates over 200-600 people, the majority being Han. What started from an ethnic
conflict between Han and Uyghur coworkers at a toy factory resulting in 2 Uyghur being
killed in Guangdong, erupted into protests in the streets of Urumqi, the capital of
Xinxiang thousands of Uyghur and culminating breaking out into a riot with looting and
killing. Fueled by the July unrest, late August and early September saw a series of
syringe attacks38 blamed on Islamic extremists on civilians. In reaction to the attacks,
thousands of residents held protests for several days, resulting in the death of five people.
Closer to home an the TIP claimed responsibility for a bus explosion killing one and
injuring 10 in Kunming during the run-up to the Olympic games in Beijing . This act of
35
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terrorism was accompanied by a threat of “Jihad in Yunnan,” even as the Chinese
government in an attempt to regain stability and calm fears denied that it was indeed a
terrorist attack.
While the unrest in Xinjiang may be physically hundreds of miles away from
Kunming, and ethnically different from the Hui, my interview research unexpectedly
brought the events directly into the lives of the the Hui migrant laborers looking for jobs
in Kunming. The employment discrimination they faced by stereotypes as “Islamic
extremists” is well felt. The repression of the Muslim Uyghur minority in Xinjaing as a
sort of ‘China’s War on Terror’ has had indirect impacts on the Hui. Who for many of the
Han Chinese are the only Muslims they have encountered. This stereotyping is then
amplified by global media, particularly American produced regarding the US War on
Terror in the Middle East. With access to television and online media like never before,
anti-Muslim propaganda has reached audiences with an unforeseen reach. Although
American news broadcasts are not nearly as popular as American music or movies, their
influence can also be strong. When discussing Chinatowns in the US and the generally
favorable attitude to Chinese people in the US with my Chinese host mother in Kunming,
she was quick to remark that of course Chinese were liked in the US, especially because
they were “not like those Arabs!” continuing by gesturing with her hands the September
11, twin tower attack. The subtle influences of global media (and state media) reporting
have helped to develop a climate of prejudice towards Muslims that I encountered all too
often among Kunming’s non-Hui urban residents. While not to generalize Han attitudes
towards Hui, it must be addressed that a strong prejudice does exist among the many of
the Han, having particularly negative effects in the scenario of Hui applying for jobs
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when the employer is Han and stemming too from what they see as preferential
affirmative action programs and other advantages given to ethnic minorities. Although
perhaps unintentional on the part of reporters, it is a true testament of the broad and
influential reach of globalization that the slanted reporting of American news media39 in
New York City can have an effect on a Hui Muslim’s job application success prospects in
Kunming.

2004 Hui Migrant Riots in Henan
Ethnic and religious discrimination, and their general economic marginalization
have been a real source of conflict in China, and not just in Xinjiang, as many believe. In
Henan Province in October 2004 an ethnic battle between Han Chinese and Muslim Hui
minorities using farm implements left over 100 dead, including 15 policemen, by one
account. Hui men often complain that they and other Muslim minorities have few “real
jobs,” and are limited to owning restaurants in the local “Minority Street,” where they
serve patrons kebabs and bread. Started when a Hui refused to reimburse a Han after a
traffic incident, the inferior economic opportunities available to the migrant Hui.
Beginning with a small conflict divulged into full on riots surfaced the marginalized social
and economic position. Can this violence, born out of injustice and discrimination be
transformed into more meaningful development of civil society? Although a tragic incident,
it also demonstrates their awareness of their disadvantaged position, an issue that would serve
as a powerful impetus for developing civil society within the community. The case of the Hui
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riots in Henan show that the frustration is there, but what will matter for effective
development of civil society will take self-organization, a tool they already have utilized in
their religious organization.

Prospects for Migrant Labor Hui Participation in the Development of Civil Society
What is civil society? According to the London School of Economics, civil
society refers to the arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests,
purposes and values.40Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and
institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil
societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development
of non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faithbased organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social
movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups. Civil society, while
lacking a universal definition, has almost universally been thought of in the context as a
promoter of democracy. In addition, New Left scholars have promoted civil society as
having “a key role in defending people against the state and the market and in asserting
the democratic will to influence the state.”41
China's drive in the direction of economic reform and modernization in the past
30 years has shaped new opportunities for citizens to participate. While the government
took care of all services from 1949-78, the new neoliberal policies have made it so the
Chinese people are seeking ways to organize their own institutions to respond to social
40
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needs and express grievances and concerns in a way which influences the policy-making
process. Crucial have been the influx of NGOs that serve needs on everything from
education to the environment.42 However, the most important of civil society institutions
have been those that challenge the fundamental power relationship as opposed to those
that are charity based in nature. Two of the most agitating elements of civil society, as
witnessed dramatically in the Solidarity movement in Poland43 and recently in the Arab
Spring44 uprisings has been those related to trade unionism and religious institutions.
What role do the urban Hui laborers have in developing civil society in China?
Although unaddressed in academic circles, the unique experiences of the urban Hui and
in light of the events in the Arab Spring have both positioned the Hui to play a potentially
large role in the continuing and exciting development of civil society in the world’s
largest non-democratic regime.

Migrant worker mentality

Many of the urban Hui are migrants, coming from poorer, rural areas in search of better
job prospects.45 While this group is without a doubt one of the more marginalized, there
has been an increasing militancy and demanding of rights by migrant workers in China
42
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specifically in retaliation to this marginalization and social and political exclusion.
Feeling directly the consequences of growing inequality between the rural and urban
divide, but also in the urban areas they settle, along with the rural hukou bias, the lack of
socially mobile jobs, they have come out as one of the strongest demanders of wage
increases and reform of social welfare.46

The Islamic Advantage: Established Institutions and Community

The Islamic community centers and mosques are some of China’s oldest and most
established realms of civil society47 providing a guarded social space that can work as a
buffer government influence. Although Islam in China is highly regulated,48 the realm of
the mosque, especially those farther away from Beijing, has gained a degree of unofficial
autonomy that situates it as a potentially strong faith-based organization in the
development of civil society. By providing a space in which Muslims not only gather for
worship, but also speak about community issues even delving into politics, the mosque is
then one of the few public-community based centers in China where such mass dialogue
can be conducted. In the development of civil society, Islamic centers such as the
mosque have then become crucial for the dissemination of ideas and the empowering of
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community members in having a stake in their community. This discussion in an
institutional setting, though not necessarily challenging the state influence, inevitably
questions policies in a way that gatherings in cafes and restaurants that lack the approval
and organizational structure that discussions in the mosque have.

Spiritual growth and responsibility in the context of the atheist CCP

In the CCP’s careful strategy of granting religious “freedom”49 while officially
being though state sanctioned the officially atheist Chinese government has pacified and
stabilized the hundreds of millions of religious Chinese citizens. By granting limited
autonomy, the CCP has allowed religion to be legally permissible while still under the
eye of the communist party. The states influence on Islamic institutions vary, from
limitations on the number of pilgrims available to go to the Haj pilgrimage in Saudi
Arabia (with official state accompaniment), to the fact that many longtime clerics have
been forced to enroll in Chinese patriotic programs and undergo annual licensing
procedure.50 The Chinese government only allows mosques that have been sanctioned by
the Chinese Islamic Association, a body that acts as another government entity intrusion
into spiritual life. In an example of the kind of religious freedom the CCP promotes, in
1995, the Chinese Islamic Association decreed: "No scripture studies or Arabic classes
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are to be held without permission.”51 Religious freedom then, is a narrow concept devised
by the government to maintain stability in a changing social and economic climate.

Despite the official government regulations pressed onto Islam, after visiting the
mosque I found that criticism of the government and policies were fairly open. Many
people were more than happy to voice their opinions on the government and their own
marginalization as Muslims. Sitting in the safety of the walls of the mosque, after
interviewing a group of elderly men in the mosque square, a Islamic worker described his
frustration:

The government does not understand us and they make very little attempts to
understand Muslims. It is our Islamic duty to attend the Haj, but the government
cheats us out. They limit who can go, and then they raise the prices so that few
can afford it. This is oppression of our religious duties and just another example
of the corruption of the CCP.”52
Such critical discourse about the communist party in a mosque that was sanctioned by the
government and led by an imam also sanctioned by the government, shows that despite
the governments efforts to maintain its control over religious life, that for many Muslims
the strong spiritual beliefs in Islam and the feeling of safety in the mosque area are
important pieces of any development of civil society in China.

Labor and Social Discrimination: The Backlash
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The discrimination faced by Hui laborers, as both Muslims and as migrant workers adds
another element in the prospects for developing civil society. Social and economic
pressure has in the other countries been a primary force for the development of social
movements.53 Although the Chinese government has put increasing effort into
maintaining labor stability by raising wages, the recent labor shortage and outbreak of
strikes in China has signaled evidence that a ‘Lewisian moment’ is fast approaching, the
economic point in which industrial wages begin to rise quickly at the point when the
supply of surplus labor from the countryside tapers. This has particular complexities in
China, where independent trade unions are illegal giving workers few outlets to voice
grievances, while migrant labors especially have become more and more vocal in
expressing desire to join an independent trade union. Independent trade unions are one of
the most crucial components in civil society—both empowering workers to
democratically elect their union representatives and at the same time, allowing workers to
begin collectively bargaining, pushing for higher safety standards and wages and thus
economic justice as well. Independent trade unions provide an outlet to directly challenge
the state-corporate status quo. While independent trade unions are still illegal, the
existence of faith-based institutions such as the mosque are important, especially those
that serve primarily migrant worker population; for these migrant workers who look to
the mosque in assisting with adjustment to the city and look at the mosque-attending
community for connections in labor, the mosque takes on the duel role as a religious and
community center. While the development of such services into those offered by
independent trade unions have not materialized, the changing economic landscape and
Mauss, Armand L.. "Social Problems as Social Movements." In Social problems as social
movements. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975. 38-71
53
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the growing number and of upset, discriminated workers without a permanent home in
search for a job can potentially open up the services of the religious institutions into a
broader reach to address more and more community problems. As labor-related
grievances become more and more common, they will become true community problems,
and will demand a place to be addressed; the mosque courtyard, an established
community space of political discourse and criticism of government and economic
discrimination seems like a likely place avenue for these problems to find a home

External Labor and Islam: Civil Society Developments and Challenges to CCP
Stability
A key component of the global Islamic community has been the dispersion of
Islamic scholars throughout the world. From Egypt to Malaysia, Islamic communities
have built increasing solidarity through the building of relationships on the concept of
international brotherhood and common religion. China, the country with the eighteenth
largest Muslim population with more Muslims than Syria and Malaysia, is no exception.
Increasing contact with the greater Islamic world, whether through the facilitation of
Arabic study (an important aspiration for those seeking to become imams or obtaining a
better understanding of the Koran) or for cultural purposes. With this travel and cultural
exchange comes the inevitable development of relationships between Muslims of
different nations and the sharing of ideas. This has become a source of worry for the
CCP, who regularly deny what they deem as radical imams from preaching in China.
However, even the CCP’s attempt to control the religious exchange internationally can
never be 100% successful. The unique geographic orientation of Islam, one that faces to
Mecca in the heart of the Middle East has made a looking towards the Middle East a
40

religious necessity for Chinese Muslims. While the CCP may see it as a positive point in
training translators to meet the needs of diplomacy in dealing with the largest energyproducing region on the planet, they take quite a different stance when regarding the
recent political uprising in the region known as the Arab Spring.
Both the Arab Spring, the toppling of multiple governments in a matter of months
in Muslim countries beginning with Tunisia and still being waged in Syria and Bahrain
today, and the Uyghur riots in Xinjiang have been highly censored through the state-run
media and online searches as well by the CCP. Both events have been seen as threats to
stability and have been met with disapproval from the central government that has sought
to guide China through peaceful, stable economic development. But not even Internet
filters and TV censorship can keep the Hui Muslim community in the dark from the
democratic Muslim uprisings around the world. The regulation of Islam in China, though
strict, has not managed to stop criticisms of the government in their very owned
government sanctioned mosques, the community and spiritual center for Hui Muslims.
Islam’s contribution to the Arab Spring, while debatable to extent is undeniable; Islamic
political preaching, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s “Allah is the source of
political authority” have proven to have a rousing effect in the toppling of oppressive
state regimes in the Middle East.54
The Hui, as the largest Muslim population in China have many differences with
the Muslims in the Middle East; they are integrated into Chinese society, speak Chinese
and generally look Chinese. Chinese people are far more satisfied with their government
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than Egyptians or Tunisians were, pre-Arab Spring, even if they were unelected. Their
identity is that of Chinese Muslims, and despite discrimination, loyalty to the state
remains strong. The frustration levels against the state are not as strong, many enjoying
official ethnic minority privileges such as being allowed to have more than one child and
affirmative action at universities. This has also been a crucial source of conflict for Han
and Hui relations as the Han often view their treatment as preferential and unfair. How
the CCP remains to stabilize the Muslim population in order to maintain a ‘harmonious
society’ is a development will be a hot topic to watch in the coming years.
Although influence of the Arab Spring has yet to be seen in the form of collective
action, social networking and increasing global communication and mobility have been
shown to spread ideas through even the most oppressive regimes. Even while influence in
the form of collective action remains absent, the beginning development of civil society
that has increasingly empowered Chinese citizens to find their own solutions to problems
as opposed to state reliance can be viewed as crucial foundation building processes for
civil society.

The Chinese government’s swift response in censoring Arab Spring related
content can be interpreted not only as a method to stamp out any possibilities of labor
unrest, but also any Muslim unrest. The pre-emptive and aggressive censorship and
subsequent propagandist framing of the events in the Middle East by the CCP
demonstrates not only the vulnerability of the CCP, but larger concerns over growing
unrest in the country. Whether Hui Muslims or migrant laborers realize it or not, their
potential influence on state instability is well noted by the Chinese government, evident
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by the sheer speed and comprehensiveness of the media censorship on the Arab Spring.
Certainly the dramatic improvements in quality of life economically for the majority of
Chinese in the past 30 years have kept any Arab Style-like revolution off the minds of
most, but the short-lived Jasmine Spring55 protests show that at least some segments of
the populations have been pushed to the edge and are willing to seek change through nontraditional methods. While any sort of collective action is not immediately likely, the
development of civil society has helped build the foundation for public discourse and
criticism of the status quo. The Hui Muslim migrant laborers and their dual stakes as
members of both faith-based and labor-based organizations that are fundamental to the
development civil society has put them in a prime position in the continuing building of
this groundwork. As income inequality and discrimination grow, so too will civil society
as it fills the gaps of social problems that the state fails to address. Lacking
representative bodies to voice this frustration provides another aspect of life in China in
which civil society to cover.
While increasing joblessness and a labor shortage seem contradictory several
factors in Chinese society have made such a seemingly conflicting labor market possible.
In 2010, up to 25% of recent college grads were unable to find jobs.56 This comes
as the result of multiple roots; the government push for more and more college graduates
has created a flux of graduates where jobs requiring degrees remain absent. The structure
of the Chinese economy, still laregly based on the low-wage, low-skill manufacturing

"China Cracks Down After 'Jasmine Revolution' Protest Call - TIME." Breaking News,
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export-orientation model has led to a serious skill mismatch for graduates. The
consequences of the ‘only child’ generation have given Chinese graduates high
expectations as they often benefitted from full devotion of parents resources.
Expectations are often met with disappointment upon college graduate and the realization
that they will only make marginally more than migrant workers working factory jobs.57
While unemployment for college graduates and a labor shortage for migrant
workers at first may seem like diverging concerns, both face the future prospect of
massive structural unemployment, a condition that is much more difficult to fix than
unemployment caused by fiscal crisis. Second generation migrant workers are more
likely to make demands, leading to higher and higher wages. These higher wages have
also been marked by increasing expectations, ones that will be hard to meet within the
current structure of the Chinese economy that relies on cheap exports as a source of
growth, thus finding themselves in a similar situation with college graduates. Wage
increases, however, have a limit. At the point in which wages outstrip productivity, many
migrant workers too will find themselves facing structural unemployment.
Rising unemployment,58 dissatisfaction with job prospects in both rural and urban
China, increasing poverty among urban populations,59 rising inflation,60 outsourcing of
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factory jobs to places with lower labor costs such as Vietnam and Cambodia,61 and a
labor shortage62 characterized by rising militancy and an unwillingness to take jobs for
wages that do are unsatisfactory has made fear of social unrest a top concern for the CCP.
In the context of labor relations, labor as a source of social instability is a reality
that China will grapple with in the coming years. How it leads to developments in civil
society has yet to be clearly articulated, although an increasingly frustrated and militant
workforce has led to a climate in independent trade unions, crucial components to civil
society, has emerged as a demand by laborers. The Hui migrant workers, with an
abundance of already established Islam-based community organizations, as recipients of
double discrimination as both Muslim minorities and migrant laborers, and finally as a
group with strong connections to the Muslim nations that have recently undergone
democratic revolutions in the Middle East are thus poised to play a role in the expansion
of civil society and the foundation for democratic progress in China.
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Appendicle A: Research Challenges, Triumphs and Experiences

Recommendations for Further Study
Buddhism’s role in Social Justice in China
Migrant Laborers and China’s one trade union
Government policy towards ethnic minorities as a source of Han-Minority conflict
Islam and social unrest in the PRC
Helpful Contact info:
Professor He Jinsong, a professor on migration at Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences
13888834358
Ma Laoshi, a local expert on the history of the Hui in Kunming

1) Getting access to the Muslim community

As a whole I found the Hui in Kunming to be extremely friendly and willing to speak
about their experiences. However, the extent to that I could enter the community and
conduct interviews were greatly expanded by a local expert and member of the Hui
community, Ma Laoshi. Through his help I could be introduced as an American student
interested in the Hui, greatly expanding the number of Hui residents I could speak with.
He is a trusted community member, and without him I can’t imagine being able to have
as many Hui be as comfortable speaking with me. As an American and an outsider, some
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Hui were not as comfortable speaking with me. Criticism of the US government’s
policies in the Middle East was frequently vented towards and at me as an American.
Overall however, most Hui understand that I have little control over my governments
actions, a situation they can relate to as minority in China.

2) Sensitive Questions
Social unrest in relation to Islam and labor is a highly controversial topic in China.
Attempts to probe at this topic brought repeated failure as it made interviewees
uncomfortable or even unsafe. To get around this, I learned that the framing of questions
was crucial, as well as building a longer relationship before asking these kinds of
questions.

3) Looking Muslim (or at least from Xinjiang)
One unexpected advantage I experienced was attributed to my darker skin and wider eye
folds—to many Hui and Han Chinese I look like I am from Xinjiang, the home of many
Muslims. This was a convenient genetic advantage that I think made the acceptance into
the Muslim community smoother, and one I cannot imagine possible if I looked
outwardly Caucasian.

My research experience
I feel extremely privileged and grateful to have stayed on the edges of the Hui
neighborhood. Daily observations provided me with a great opportunity to understand the
life of the urban Hui migrant workers, and their welcome and warm-hearts will be forever
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remembered.
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